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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 20010127-SC 
v. : 
PEARL TOPANOTES, : Priority No. 13 
Defendant/Petitioner. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(a) & -2(5) (1996 & 
Supp. 2001). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Given the preference for fact-sensitive issues to be addressed in the trial 
court in the first instance, may Utah's appellate courts remand for consideration of 
alternative grounds for affirmance involving, e.g., the inevitable discovery rule? 
On certiorari review, this Court reviews "'the decision of the court of appeals, not 
the decision of the trial court." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196. 1199 (Utah 1995). The 
court of appeals' decision is reviewed for correctness. State v. James, 2000 L'T 80. *| 8. 
13 P.3d576. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are at issue here. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner was charged with possession of heroin, a third degree felony (R7). 
Thereafter, petitioner moved to suppress heroin seized during a warrantless search of her 
person incident to her arrest on outstanding warrants (R29). Following an evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R98:3-4) (a copy of the oral ruling is contained 
in addendum B). Petitioner entered a conditional plea and was sentenced to an 
indeterminate statutory term of zero-to-five years (R56-57; R60-66). 
On direct appeal, the State conceded that under Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT 
App 55, 998 P.2d 274, issued approximately eight months after the trial court's ruling, 
the voluntary encounter between petitioner and police escalated to a detention when 
police failed to return petitioner's identification before running a warrants check. State 
v. Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311, f 8, n.3, 914 P.2d 695 (a copy is contained in 
addendum A). The State also conceded that the detention was not justified by 
reasonable suspicion. Id. The court of appeals agreed. Id. 
Notwithstanding, the State argued alternatively, that had the investigation 
continued without the illegality, i.e., retaining petitioner's identification, police would 
still have run the warrants check and inevitably discovered petitioner's outstanding 
? 
warrants. Therefore, the inevitable discovery rule justified admission of the heroin. Id. 
at«I 10. 
The court of appeals observed that because the State prevailed below, the fact-
sensitive issue of inevitable discovery was not addressed in the trial court. Id. at *[ 11. 
Thus, emphasizing that ";[i]t is not the function of an appellate court to make findings of 
fact because it does not have the advantage of seeing or hearing the witnesses testify^]'" 
the court of appeals remanded to the trial court *4for a factual determination on whether 
the heroin would have been inevitably discovered and for such proceedings as may be 
appropriate/' Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311, atlfij 11-12 (citation omitted). 
Petitioner timely sought certiorari review, which was granted on 18 July 2001. 
See State v. Topanotes, 29 P.3d 1 (Utah 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Several Salt Lake City police officers patrolled a known "prostitute track" on 
North Temple, on 7 October 1998, and arrested prostitute Glennar1 Thomas (R88:7-13). 
Salt Lake City police routinely attempt to confirm an arrested prostitute's actual residence 
(R88:12-13). Accordingly, three officers, including Sgt. Hansen, and Officer Mitchell, 
had Thomas take them to the trailer where she claimed to live with a girlfriend named 
Pearl, a short Native American who Thomas said was also a prostitute (R88:8-9, 20). 
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Officer Mitchell knocked on the trailer door, but received no response (R88:25). 
He then talked to the owner of the home on the same property (id.). The homeowner 
confirmed that a short Native American girl named Pearl lived in the trailer (R88:26). 
As the officers were leaving the premises, Officer Mitchell saw petitioner walk by 
and observed that she fit the homeowner's description of the girl that lived in the trailer 
(R88:27). Sgt. Hansen also saw petitioner walking toward the trailer (R88:13). Sgt. 
Hansen identified himself as a police officer and asked petitioner if she had any 
identification (R88:10). When petitioner provided identification, Sgt. Hansen handed it 
to Officer Mitchell and asked him to call it in for a warrants check (R88:10-14). The 
warrants check was "routine procedure" (R88:16, 27), or "common practice" (R88:22). 
While waiting for the warrants check to be completed, Sgt. Hansen attempted to confirm 
with petitioner Thomas's identity -id residence (R88:11). The warrants check was 
completed within five minutes and revealed two outstanding warrants for petitioner 
(R88:22). She was arrested and a search incident thereto revealedJieroin on her person 
{id.). 
Although Thomas reported living with a prostitute named Pearl, Sgt. Hansen did 
not "at that moment" suspect petitioner of any criminal activity (id.). Officer Mitchell 
concurred that while they had information petitioner was a prostitute, they did not then 
suspect of her soliciting (R88:28). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the court of appeals' committed error in 
ordenng a remand here. Indeed, where, as in this inevitable discovery case, fact-sensitive 
issues are involved, both this Court and the court of appeals have remanded for 
consideration of alternative grounds for affirmance by the tnal court, including further 
evidentiary heanng where necessary. Thus, the instant remand is consistent with the 
Utah practice and should therefore be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
GIVEN THE PREFERENCE FOR FACT-SENSITIVE ISSUES TO 
BE ADDRESSED IN THE TRIAL COURT IN THE FIRST 
INSTANCE, UTAH'S APPELLATE COURTS MAY REMAND FOR 
CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS FOR 
AFFIRMANCE INVOLVING, E.G., THE INEVITABLE 
DISCOVERY RULE 
The tnal court refused to suppress heroin discovered on defendant's person dunng 
a search incident to her arrest on outstanding warrants (R98), add B Specifically, the 
tnal court found that nothing occurred to escalate the voluntary encounter to a detention, 
including the fact that police did not immediately return petitioner's identification, but 
retained it while running the warrants check (R98:7), add. B. On appeal, the State 
conceded, and the court of appeals agreed, that under Salt Lake City v* Ray, 2000 LT 
App 55, *\ 13, 998 P.2d 274, issued approximately eight months after the tnal court's 
ruling, police retention of petitioner's identification escalated the otherwise voluntary 
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encounter to a detention requiring Fourth Amendment justification, which justification 
was lacking here. State v. Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311, «j 8, 14 P.3d 695. 
Although the State argued that the court of appeals could alternatively affirm the 
ruling below on the ground that police would have run the warrants check even without 
petitioner's identification and thus would have inevitably, legally discovered the 
outstanding warrants, the court of appeals declined to do so. Rather, noting its 
preference for the trial court to make this fact-sensitive determination in the first 
instance, the court of appeals remanded "for a factual determination on whether the 
heroin would have been inevitably discovered and for such proceedings as may be 
appropriate." Id. atff 11-12. 
On certiorari, petitioner claims that the court of appeals' remand conflicts with 
precedent from this Court and the court of appeals. Pet. Br. at 10-14. Petitioner's claims 
of conflict are illusory and otherwise fail to demonstrate that the instant remand is 
anything other than the Utah practice. 
A. Both This Court and the Court of Appeals Remand for 
Consideration of Alternative Grounds for Affirmance Which 
May Include Further Evidentiary Hearing When, as Here, the 
Issues are Fact-Sensitive. 
Petitioner complains that the court of appeals' broad remand is contrary to both 
Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Assoc, 461 P.2d 290 (Utah 1969), where this Court 
affirmed without remand on alternative grounds, and State v. Montoya 937 P.2d 145 
(Utah App. 1997), where the court of appeals reversed without remand, declining to 
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atfirm on alternative grounds. Pet Br at 10-12 Petitioner suggests that an appellate 
court must either affirm or reverse on the "existing record," but may never remand for 
consideration of alternative grounds for affirmance See Pet. Br at 14, 20-22. 
Petitioner's claim is contrary to the Utah practice.1 
Indeed, both this Court and the court of appeals have remanded for consideration 
of alternative grounds for affirmance, including further evidentiary heanng, under 
circumstances similar to this case. See, e.g., Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 904 
P 2d 677, 685 (Utah 1995) (holding record insufficient to affirm and remanding for 
further evaluation by district court); State v. Strain, 779 P 2d 221, 227 (Utah 1989) 
(remanding for an evidentiary heanng on possible alternative ground for affirmance, 1 e , 
voluntanness of confession); State v. Marshall, 791 P 2d 880, 889 (Utah App ) 
(reversing and remanding for c*reheanng"on whether petitioner had standing to contest 
the search, a possible alternative ground for affirmance), cert, denied, 800 P 2d 1105 
(Utah 1990); State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1253 (Utah App. 1*990) (remanding for 
consideration by tnal court of alternative ground for affirmance), cert, denied, 815 P 2d 
241 (Utah 1991). 
Neither Limb nor Montoya conflicts with the above case law Rather, Limb and 
Montoya represent opposite ends of the alternative grounds continuum with Limb 
'The State's Bnef of Conditional Cross-Petitioner, infra, contains the State's 
alternative argument that the court of appeals could and should have affirmed without 
remand 
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representative of cases where the alternative ground is not dependent on trial court 
clarification or further fact-finding, but is clear as a matter of law. Limb, 461 P.2d at 293 
('There is no disputed issue of fact in this case"). See also Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 LT 
61,1 20, 29 P.3d 1225 (affirming on alternative ground apparent as a matter of law). 
Montoya, on the other hand, is representative of cases where neither affirmance or 
remand for further fact-finding is justified because the alternative grounds for affirmance 
are (1) inadequately briefed or (2) clearly rebutted in the record. 937 P.2d at 150. See 
Barnett v. United States, 525 A.2d 197, 199 (D.C. App. 1987) (declining to affirm on 
alternative ground which was unsupported by the undisputed facts). 
Here, in contrast to Montoya and Barnett, upon which petitioner primarily relies, 
the court of appeals found no inadequacy in the State's briefing, nor did the court of 
appeals find the alternative ground was clearly rebutted in the existing record. 
Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311 at f 10-12. In further contrast with Limb, where there 
was no disputed issue of fact, 461 P.2d at 293, the search and seizure issue here is fact-
sensitive. Topanotes, 2000 UT 311, f 11-12. Therefore, the court of appeals was 
reluctant to affirm without allowing the trial court an opportunity to consider the facts in 
light of the alternative ground in the first instance. Id. Remand was thus an appropriate 
disposition. 
Indeed, this case, along with Renn, Strain, Marshall, and Palmer, fall into an 
area between Limb and Montoya on the alternative grounds continuum, where the 
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alternate e ground for atfirmance is apparent in the record, but requires turther 
clanfication in the trial court In these "in-between,"or generally fact-sensitive cases, the 
Ltah practice is to remand for the tnal court to consider the adequacy of an alternative 
ground for affirmance in the first instance, which may well entail an additional 
evidentian hearing. See, e.g., Strain, 779 P 2d at 227, Palmer, 803 P 2d at 1253, 
Marshall, 791 P 2d at 889. 
Defendant's reliance on State v. Hodson, 907 P 2d 1155, 1159-60 (Utah 1995), 
State v. Case, 884 P 2d 1274, 1278 (Utah App 1994), and State v. Gutierrez, 864 P 2d 
894, 903 (Utah App. 1993), is similarly unavailing Petitioner suggests these cases 
prohibit the instant remand, see Pet. Br at 21 ("This Court should decide the issues based 
on the record the [S]tate chose to create in this matter"), and at 26-27. However, in 
neither Hodson, Case, nor Gutierrez did the State argue alternative grounds for 
affirmance. Rather, these are cases where the appellate court determined that the State 
adduced insufficient evidence to support its winning theory below, and that the State was 
not entitled to remand to put on additional evidence supporting its now rejected theory on 
appeal: Ibid Thus, Hodson, Case, and Gutierrez fail to support petitioner's claim that 
remand is inappropriate here, where the State is asserting a theory different from that 
upon which it prevailed below. 
defendant's nominal reliance on Ex Parte Hergott, 588 So 2d 911, 916 (Ala 
1991), see Pet Br at 29, is distinguishable on the same grounds as Case, Hodson, and 
Gutierrez 
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B. Remand to the Trial Court for a Factual Determination 
of Possible Alternative Grounds for Affirmance Does not 
Give the State an Unfair Advantage. 
Contrary to petitioner's further suggestion, the remand here does not give the 
State an unfair advantage, even if the alternative ground for affirmance was raised for the 
first time on appeal. See Pet. Br. at 14 ("[R]emand is fundamentally unfair and serves to 
provide the [Sjtate with an unprecedented second, or in this case, third, 'bite at the 
apple.'"). This Court has previously recognized that affirmance on an alternative ground 
"does not depnve a party of a due process," and that it is not a prerequisite of the 
doctrine that the alternative ground first be raised in the trial court. DeBry v. Noble, 889 
P 2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995); Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61 atf 18 (reaffirming Limb 
and emphasizing that it is not a prerequisite of affirmance on alternative grounds that the 
alternative ground first be "raised in the lower court") (emphasis in Dipoma). Indeed, if 
the State had not prevailed on its "no detention" theory below, and so been the appellant 
in the court of appeals, the preservation rule would have precluded the State from 
asserting for the first time on appeal that the inevitable discovery rule justified admission 
of the heroin See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 774 P 2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (requiring 
that the grounds for objection below must be "distinctly and specifically stated'and that a 
general motion will not suffice.). As recognized in Montoya, there is a "significant 
difference between affirming on appeal and reversing: ;The appellate court will affirm a 
judgment on grounds not urged below, but will not rexerse the lower court on errors 
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claimed for the first time on appeal/" Id. (quoting Limb, 461 P 2d at 293 n 2) (emphasis 
in Montoya). 
Finally, if on remand the tnal court determined that further evidentiary hearing 
was necessary to address the alternative inevitable discovery theory, petitioner would be 
able to cross-examine police thereon. See Pet. Br. at 20 (asserting that because fc*[t]he 
state did not argue the issue or present evidence in the tnal court concerning the matter 
. [defendant] was not on notice of the possible application of such a unique remedy and 
she had no opportunity to cross-examine Officers Hansen or Mitchell in connection with 
its possible application."). 
C. Remand for Trial Court Evaluation of Alternative 
Grounds for Affirmance is Not Necessarily Limited to the 
Existing Record. 
In Part II of his brief, petitioner argues that even if the court of appeals' remand 
was proper, the tnal court is precluded from holding an additional evidentiary hearing -
and must evaluate the alternative theory in light of the existing record. Pet. Br. at 22 
("Utah appellate courts have specified that remand is limited to the entry of findings 
based on the facts already exi[s]ting in the record.") Once again, the cases petitioner 
cites do not support her blanket proposition. See Pet. Br. at 22-25. 
First, State v. Lopez, 873 P 2d 1127, 1140 (Utah 1994), Rucker v. Dalton. 598 
P2d 1336, 1338-1339 (Utah 1979); State v. Giron, 943 P 2d 1114, 1121 (Utah App 
1997), and State v. Genovesi 871 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah App. 1994), do not involve 
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alternatee grounds for affirmance. Rather, these are cases where the trial court applied 
an incorrect legal standard to the facts, or entered inadequate findings. The cases were 
thus remanded for the trial courts to evaluate previously admitted evidence under correct 
law or to make appropriately detailed findings. Ibid. 
Second, petitioner cannot successfully distinguish the remand in Palmer, 803 P.2d 
atl253-1254, merely because the alternative ground for affirmance in that case was 
raised first in the trial court. See Pet. Br. at 22 (asserting that "if a trial court has 
addressed a particular rule of law in the original proceeding but has entered inadequate 
findings and the facts of record are in conflict... an appellate court may remand the case 
for additional findings'and citing Palmer). In Palmer, the court of appeals expressly 
noted that the alternative ground for affirmance in that case—the inevitable discovery 
doctrine—had been raised in the trial court, but because the trial court denied the motion 
to suppress on another ground, "the trial court did not have to decide the question 
whether or not the [contraband] inevitably would have been discovered." Id. at 1253. 
The court of appeals observed it could not "properly determine the outcome of a fact-
sensitive issue where the record below is not clear and uncontroverted, or capable of only 
one finding." Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, Palmer was remanded to the trial court 
3The court of appeals quoted Rucker v. Dalton for its limited observation that 
fc
"[i]t is not the function of an appellate court to make findings of fact because it does not 
have the advantage of seeing or hearing the witnesses testify.,,, Topanotes, 2000 LT App 
311 at II 11 (quoting Rucker, 598 P.2d at 1338)). 
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tor a ""factual determination^ vv hether the e\ idence "\\ould have ine\ itablv been 
discovered and for such other proceedings as may be appropriate " Id. at 1253-1254 
Thus, even though the alternative ground for affirmance was raised below m 
Palmer, but not m this case, the result is the same: neither trial court considered it 
Remand was therefore necessary in Palmer, as it is in this case, to determine whether the 
alternative ground could in fact be established. Id. at 1253-1254. Accordingly, the 
Palmer remand is no different from the instant remand, or the remand in Mars/tali 791 
P 2d at 889, where the alternative ground that Marshall lacked standing was also raised 
for the first time on appeal. As previously set forth, Palmer, Marshall, and Topanotes* 
along with Renn and Strain comprise an "m-between"category cases where the 
alternative ground is not so clearly apparent that the appellate court can affirm without 
remand, but neither is the alternative ground so clearly refuted that reversal without 
remand is warranted as in Montoya. 
CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals committed no error in ordering a remand, including the 
possibility of further evidentiary hearing. Petitioner has not shown that the remand 
conflicts with authority from this Court or the court of appeals. Rather, the remand is 
consistent with the Utah preference that fact-sensitive alternative grounds for affirmance 
be addressed in the trial court in the first instance. 
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BRIEF OF CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITIONER 
JURISDICTION AiND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Please refer to the Brief of Respondent for the Jurisdiction and Naaire of 
Proceedings. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Is remand superfluous because the record is adequate to affirm on the 
alternative ground that police would have run a warrants check even without 
illegally retaining petitioner's identification and thus discovery of the outstanding 
warrants was inevitable? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Please refer to the Brief of Respondent for the Standard of Review 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Please refer to the Brief of Respondent for the Statement of the Case. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Please refer to the Brief of Respondent for the Statement of the Facts 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals correctly recognized that inevitable discovery was an 
alternative ground for affirmance here, but erred when it failed to recognize the existing 
record was also adequate to affirm without remand Indeed, the uncontro verted ev idence 
and pertinent case law establish that a warrants check was routine procedure in this 
circumstance and thus could and would have been run with or without retaining 
petitioner's identification It was therefore inevitable that police would discover her 
outstanding warrants, and that the heroin would be discovered dunng a search incident to 
her arrest thereon 
ARGUMENT 
REMAND IS SUPERFLUOUS BECAUSE THE RECORD IS 
ADEQUATE TO AFFIRM ON THE ALTERNATIVE GROUND 
THAT POLICE WOULD HAVE RUN A WARRANTS CHECK 
EVEN WITHOUT ILLEGALLY RETAINING PETITIONER'S 
IDENTIFICATION; THUS, IT WAS INEVITABLE THE 
OUTSTANDING WARRANTS WOULD BE DISCOVERED 
For reasons set forth in the Brief of Respondent, the State maintains the court of 
appeals' remand is consistent with the Utah practice However, in this conditional cross-
petition, the State submits that the record is adequate to affirm on the sound alternative 
ground of inevitable discovery, thus the instant remand is superfluous Thus, while the 
court of appeals correctly recognized that inevitable discovery was an alternative ground 
for affirmance here, it erred in failing to recognize the existing record was also adequate 
to affirm without remand. See Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311 at«[«[ 9-12. 
A. The Inevitable Discovery Rule Requires No Absolute 
Proof, Beyond Evidence of Predictable Police Routine, of 
What Would Have Hypothetically Occurred Absent the 
Illegality. 
The inevitable discovery rule allows the admission of evidence if'"the 
prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information 
ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.'" State v. 
Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311,«[ 10, 14 P.3d 695 (quoting State v. James 2000 UT 80, «| 
16, 13 P 3d 576 (following Nix v. Williams, 467 U S. 431, 444 (1984), and overruling 
State v. James, 1999 UT App 17, 977 P.2d 489)). Indeed, the issue in determining 
"inevitable discovery" is what would have occurred if the investigation had continued 
without the illegality. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 & 459; United States v. Larsen,\ll F 3d 
984, 987 (10th Cir. 1997), cert, denied, 522 U S. 1140 (1998). Ttjus, the inevitable 
discovery rule permits "the prosecution to purge the taint of illegally obtained evidence 
by prov mg, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such evidence inevitably would 
have been discovered, absent the illegality, by proper and predictable police investigative 
procedures." State v. Miller, 709 P 2d 225, 242 (Ore. 1985), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 141 
(1986). The majority of courts follow the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
requires no absolute proof, beyond evidence of predictable police routine, of what would 
have hypothetically occurred absent the illegality Larsen, 127 F 3d at 986. 
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As will be demonstrated here, the court of appeals' remand overlooks 
uncontroverted evidence that the warrants check here was in fact predictable police 
routine. 
B. The Court of Appeals Remand Overlooks 
I^controverted Evidence That the Instant Warrants 
Check Was Predictable Police Routine. 
Here, defendant's encounter with police was initially voluntary and required no 
Fourth Amendment justification (see R98:3) (a copy of the trial court's ruling is 
contained in addendum B). See Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, ffl! 9-12, 998 
P.2d 274 (h"[A]n officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so 
long as the citizen is not detained against his will'") (quoting State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 
616, 617-618 (Utah 1987)). Police can lawfully approach a citizen and request 
identification without triggering Fourth Amendment protections. Id. at f 12; State v. 
Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah App. 1990) (recognizing as a matter of law that 
request for identification cannot convert innocent encounter into a seizure), cert, denied, 
815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). They can even ask incriminating questions. See Florida v. 
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 & 439 (1991) (acknowledging police can approach 
individuals without reasonable suspicion and ask potentially incnminating questions). It 
was thus undisputed in the court of appeals that police lawfully obtained petitioner's 
identification during the initially voluntary encounter. See Topanotes, 2000 UT App 
311 at«[«[7-8. 
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Having lawfully obtained petitioner's identification, police properly proceeded to 
run a warrants check. See Jackson^ 805 P.2d at 768. As noted by the trial court, a 
warrants check can generally be performed at any time on any individual (R88:37). 
Indeed, assuming a suspect is not otherwise detained, "[police] may run a warrants check 
or make any other use of the information/' Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at f 13 n.2. See also 
State v. Navanick, 1999 UT App 265,1fl[ 2-3, 987 P.2d 1276 (pre-detention warrants 
check), cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000); Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617 (routine 
warrants checks during voluntary encounter). Cf. State v. Soukharith, 570 N.W.2d 344, 
353 (Neb. 1997) (pre-detention NCIC records check on license plates did not amount to 
investigatory stop and therefore did not require reasonable suspicion); State v. Myrick, 
659 A.2d 976, 980 (1995) ("reasonably clear that no seizure is involved in the [pre-
detention] check of a license plate number"); State v. Owens, 599 N.E.2d 859, 860 (Ohio 
App. 1991) (officer's pre-detention check of motor vehicle records not a Fourth 
Amendment violation where it did not interrupt, restrain or detaiif driver); State v. 
Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069, 1072 (R.I. 1997) (upholding pre-detention computer check). 
Thus, the only mistake police made here was in retaining petitioner's 
identification for the duration of the warrants check. Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311 at «| 
8 n.3. If police here had merely viewed the identification, obtained the desired 
information, and promptly returned it, the warrants check would not have "per se 
escalate[d] the encounter into a level two stop/' Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at«[ 13 n.2 (citing 
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State v. Higgins 884 P 2d 1242, 1245 n 2 (Ltah 1994)) The initially voluntary 
encounter only rose to a detention when police did not promptly return petitioner's 
identification (R98 7) Given this circumstance, and the court of appeals' then recently 
issued opinion in Ray, the State conceded and the court of appeals agreed, "4a reasonable 
person in [petitioner's] position would not feel free to just walk away, thereby 
abandoning her identification.'" Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311 at <[ 8 (quoting Ray, 2000 
UT App 55 at H 13) 
While the ensuing detention would have been justified if supported by reasonable 
suspicion, police made plain below that they did not suspect petitioner of solicitation or 
other cnminality when they approached to question her about Thomas, the prostitute they 
had just arrested, and whose identity and residence they were attempting to verify (see 
R88 16, 28) Therefore, the detention engendered by retaining petitioner's identification 
was not justified under the Fourth Amendment Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311 at % 8 n 3 
Notwithstanding the illegal detention, the parties elicited below that the warrants 
check was "routine procedure" (R88 16, 22), or "common practice" (R88 27) It is this 
uncontroverted and cntical evidence which the court of appeals overlooked in remanding 
to the trial court for a "factual determination on whether the heroin would have been 
inevitably discovered[ ]" Id. at % 12 Because the warrants check was routine procedure, 
police would have conducted the warrants check as part of their investigation and 
confirmation of Thomas' residence, regardless of whether petitioner provided them with 
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identification (R88:16, 22, 27). See Navanick, 1999 LT App 265 atC€I 2-3 (warrants 
check performed based on witness report of defendant's name). See also State v. 
Hansen, 837 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah App. 1992) (warrants check performed based on 
defendant's verbal report of name and date of birth). Therefore, having verified 
petitioner's name, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that police could and 
would have run the warrants check with or without retaining the identification (R88:16, 
22, 27). Police would have thus learned of petitioner's outstanding warrants, even absent 
the illegality. See Larsen, 127 F.3d at 986; Miller, 709 P.2d at 242. 
In sum, the court of appeals' erred in concluding that it could not affirm on the 
existing record, but rather, must remand to the trial court for a "factual determination." 
Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311 at f^ 12. The record facts and pertinent case law clearly 
establish that a warrants check in this circumstance was predictable police routine. 
Therefore, it was inevitable police would discover petitioner's outstanding warrants even 
without her identification (or without the illegality), and that she "Would be arrested 
thereon. See Larsen, 127 F.3d at 986. Accordingly, the court of appeals should have 
affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress on the alternative ground of inevitable 
discovery. See Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, Iff 17-21, 29 P.2d 1225 C[I]t is well 
settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable 
on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record'") (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk 
Producers Ass'n, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (Utah 1969). See also State v. Chevre, 2000 
20 
LT App 6, *!*[ 12-13, 994 P.2d 1278 (affirming on alternative ground where record 
contained "sufficient and uncontroverted evidence supporting the [alternative ground] to 
place [defendant] on notice that the [State] may rely thereon on appeal") (quotation 
omitted)). 
CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals' remand is an unnecessary waste of judicial resources. This 
Court should affirm the denial of the motion to suppress on the alternative ground of 
inevitable discovery. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on _/5january 2002. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v 
Pearl TOPANOTES, Defendant and Appellant. 
No 990708-CA. 
Nov 9, 2000. 
Rehearing Denied Dec 15, 2000. 
Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Salt 
Lake Department, Leslie A Lewis, J , of third degree 
possession of a controlled substance, and defendant 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Thome, J , held that: 
(1) officers' detention of defendant during time it took 
them to check for outstanding warrants was in 
violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, 
and (2) whether police officers' discovery of 
defendant's outstanding warrants supported 
application of inevitable discovery exception to 
exclusionary rule was a question for the trial court, 
rather than the Court of Appeals. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law <S» 1139 
HOkl 139 Most Cited Cases 
The determination of whether an encounter with law 
enforcement officers constitutes a seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment is a legal conclusion that the 
Supreme Court reviews for correctness. U S C.A. 
Const Amend. 4. 
[2] Arrest <$=>63 4(1) 
35k63 4( 1) Most Cited Cases 
[2] Arrest <§=>63 5(4) 
35k63 5(4) Most Cited Cases 
[2] Criminal Law <§=M224(1) 
110k 1224(1) Most Cited Cases 
Three levels of constitutionally permissible 
encounters between police officers and citizens exist: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime and 
pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained 
against his will, (2) an officer may seize a person if 
the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the 
person has committed or is about to commit a crime, 
however, the detention must be temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose ot 
the stop; and (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the 
officer has probable cause to believe an offense has 
been committed or is being committed. U S C A 
Const Amend. 4 
[3] Arrest <S=>63 5(9) 
35k63 5(9) Most Cited Cases 
Police officers did not have a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that defendant who was convicted of 
possession of a controlled substance had committed 
or was about to commit a crime, and thus officers 
detention of defendant during time it took them to 
check for outstanding warrants was in violation o( 
defendant's Fourth Amendment right against 
unreasonable seizures, where reasonable person in 
defendant's position would not have felt free to just 
walk away. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend 4 
[4] Criminal Law <§=> 1134(3) 
HOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
[4] Criminal Law <®=> 1181.5(7) 
HOkl 181.5(7) Most Cited Cases 
Whether police officers' discovery of defendant's 
outstanding warrants supported application, of 
inevitable discovery exception to exclusionary rule 
was a question for ihe trial court, rather than the 
Court of Appeals, necessitating remand for factual 
determination as to whether heroin discovered on 
defendant's person would have been inevitably 
discovered. 
[5] Criminal Law <S=>394 1(3) 
110k394 1(3) Most Cited Cases 
To determine whether evidence obtained as a result of 
a violation of the Fourth Amendment can be admitted 
at a defendant's trial, the Court of Appeals examines 
whether the evidence has been come at by 
exploitation of the illegality or by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint 
U S C A Const Amend. 4 
[6] Criminal Law <®=>394 1(3) 
110k394 1(3) Most Cited Cases 
Inevitable discovery is a valid exception to the 
Copr $ West 2001 No Claim to Ong US Govt Works 
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(Cite as- 14 P 3d 695) 
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exclusionary rule and the appropriate standard 
governing the inevitable discovery ex ption is 
whether the prosecution can establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the information 
ultimately would have been discovered by lawful 
means the state must show that the evidence would 
have been discovered, not simply that it could or 
might have been discovered U S C A Const Amend 
4 
[7] Criminal Law <®=> 1181(1) 
HOkl 181(1) Most Cited Cases 
It is not the function of an appellate court to make 
findings of fact because it does not have the 
advantage of seeing or hearing the witnesses testify, 
moreover complete, accurate, and consistent findings 
of fact are essential to the resolution of a dispute 
under the proper rule of law 
*696 Linda M Jones and Ralph Dellapiana, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges GREENWOOD, JACKSON, and 
THORNE 
OPINION 
THORNE, Judge 
*J 1 Defendant Pearl Topanotes appeals from her 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann § 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp 1999) We reverse and 
remand 
BACKGROUND 
* 2 On October 7, 1998 three Salt Lake City police 
officers detained defendant on a public street and 
requested her identification. The officers retained 
defendant's identification, outside her presence, for 
approximately five minutes to check for outstanding 
warrants The warrant check revealed at least one 
outstanding warrant, [FNI] so the officers arrested 
defendant The otficers then searched defendant and 
found heroin Defendart was ultimately charged 
with possession of a controlled substance 
Fx The nature and amount of the 
ou anding vvarrant(s) was not disclosed in 
the record 
*[ 3 Defendant moved to suppress the admission ot 
the heroin The trial court denied the motion and 
defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one 
count of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, however, she conditioned her plea on the 
right to appeal from the trial court's denial ot her 
motion 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] *! 4 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in 
denying her motion because the police otficers 
conducted a level-two stop without the requisite 
articulable suspicion '[T]he determination ot 
whether an encounter with law enforcement otficers 
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment 
is a legal conclusion that we review for correctness ' 
Salt Lake City v Ray, 2000 UT App 55 «[ 8 998 
P 2d 274 
ANALYSIS 
[2] % 5 Three levels of constitutionally permissible 
encounters between police officers and citizens exist 
(I) an officer may approach a citizen at an'time 
[sic] and pose questions so long as the citizen is 
not detained against his will, (2) an officer mav 
seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable 
suspicion" that the person has committed or is 
about to commit a crime, however, the 
"detention must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuale the purpose ot the 
stop," (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the 
officer has probable cause to believe an offense 
has been committed or is being committed 
Id (quoting State v Deitman 739 P 2d 616 617-18 
(Utah 1987)) (per curiam) (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted) 
1] 6 We addressed a similar situation in Rax [FN2] In 
that case, two police officers approached the 
defendant as she stood on a walkwav near a 
convenience store See id at *[ 4 The officers asked 
for and then retained the defendant's identification to 
check for outstanding warrants, a process which took 
about five minutes See id Before finally 
determining the detendant's warrant status one ot the 
officers asked to search her bags See id The 
defendant consented to the search, and the otficer 
found drug paraphernalia See id a t c 6 The otficers 
then arrested *697 her and charged her with 
possessing drug paraphernalia See id at cfl 6-7 
Copr e West 2001 No Claim to Ong US Govt Works 
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FN2. The Utah Court of Appeals decided 
Ray on March 2, 2000, about eight months after the 
trial court decided this matter. 
H 7 The defendant moved to suppress the admission 
of the drug paraphernalia. See id. at U 7.Following a 
heanng on the motion, the trial court determined that 
the encounter did not violate the defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights and denied the motion. See id. 
On appeal, we reversed the trial court, explaining that 
"[g]iven the totality of the circumstances, it is clear 
that a reasonable person in [defendant's] position 
would not feel free to just walk away, thereby 
abandoning her identification ." See id. at % 13 
(emphasis added). 
[3] H 8 In the present matter, after examining the 
"totality of the circumstances" surrounding the 
encounter between the officers and defendant, we 
believe that "a reasonable person in [defendant's] 
position would not feel free to just walk away, 
thereby abandoning her identification." Id. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the detention was a 
level two detention made without articulable 
suspicion in violation of defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights. [FN3] 
FN3. The State concedes, on appeal, in light 
of Ray, that by failing to immediately return 
defendant's identification card, the 
encounter escalated to a level-two detention. 
The State also concedes that the police 
officers had no "articulable suspicion" that 
defendant had "committed or was about to 
commit a crime," and therefore the 
detention was a seizure in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
R][5] H 9 We must next address whether the 
evidence resulting from the violation can be admitted 
at defendant's trial. Thus, we examine " 'whether ... 
the evidence has been come at by exploitation of [the] 
illegality or by means sufficiently distinguishable to 
be purged of the primary taint.' " State v. Northrup, 
756 P.2d 1288, 1294 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (quoting 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 
S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)). Furthermore, we 
must "determine whether the [search of Topanotes] 
fall[s] within the recognized limited exceptions to the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement." State v. 
Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah Ct.App. 1995). 
[6] U 10 The State argues that the officer's discovery 
of defendant's outstanding warrants supports the 
application of the inevitable discovery exception to 
this case. Inevitable discovery is a valid exception to 
the exclusionary rule, see State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 
1288, 1293 (Utah Ct.App. 1988), and "[t]he 
appropriate standard governing the inevitable 
discovery exception is whether 'the prosecution can 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
information ultimately would have been discovered 
by lawful means.'" State v. James, 2000 UT 80, H 16, 
405 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 
U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 
(1984)). More precisely, the State " 'must show that 
the evidence 'would' have been discovered, not 
simply that it "could" or "might" have been 
discovered.' " M.V. v. State, 1999 UT App 104,11 12,. 
977 P.2d 494 (quoting Genovesi, 909 P.2d at 923 n. 
8) (alterations in original). 
[7] 1| 11 Because the trial court ruled that the initial 
detention was legal, the issue of inevitable discovery 
was not addressed below. "This court has consistently 
recognized that [issues of search and seizure] are 
highly fact sensitive," State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 
767, 770 (Utah Ct.App. 1990), and "[i]t is not the 
function of an appellate court to make findings of fact 
because it does not have the advantage of seeing or 
hearing the witnesses testify." Rucker v. Dalton, 598 
P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utab 1979). Moreover, "complete, 
accurate[,] and consistent findings of fact ... [are] 
essential to the resolution of dispute under the proper 
rule of law." Id. 
U 12 Therefore, we remand for a factual 
determination on whether the heroin would have been 
inevitably discovered and for such proceedings as 
may be appropriate. 
H 13 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, 
Presiding Judge and NORMAN H. JACKSON, 
Associate Presiding Judge. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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ADDENDUM B 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PEARL TOPANOTES, 
Defendant. 
-0O0-
Case No. 981920853 SF 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
(Videotape Proceedings) 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 28th day of July, 
1999, commencing at the hour of 9:55 a.m., the above-
entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE 
LESLIE LEWIS, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court 
for the purpose of this cause, and that the following 
videotape proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A H C E S 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
MARK KOURIS 
Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RALPH DELLAPIANA 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association 
424 East^500 South, Suite 300 
Sal t LaH*;cit5r Utah- 84AU 
2000 FEE f 
i < ^ . * 
ORIGINAL ^ w " A * £ _ "V „ " A M -34 
&OOI 0\2T7-
P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. DELLAPIANA: I think she 
pronounces it Topanotes. 
THE COURT: Topanotes. Thank you. I 
probably won't get it right anyway; but Topanotes. 
And it's 981920853, 9919199392. In the latter 
case, she's charged with a Class B misdemeanor of 
mischievous conduct, I've never seen it couched that way. 
Mischievous conduct? Is that how the City 
categorizes it? I would have thought it would be 
disorderly, or... 
In any event, and the other one is illegal 
possession of a controlled substance, a third-degree. 
The defendant has joined us. Good morning, Ms. 
Topanotes. 
MS. TOPANOTES: Good morning. 
THE COURT: And I'll note for the 
record that Mr. Dellapiana is here on her behalf. The 
State is represented. 
And I've had an opportunity to consider by way 
of what has been submitted by way of written product on 
the motion to suppress and am prepared to rule on that. 
I also have taken into account and carefully 
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1 stop and the more serious Level Two stop obviously is 
2 predicated upon articulable suspicion to justify the 
3 stop. In this case, I don't believe we get to that 
4 point, because I think this stops short of a Level Two 
5 stop. 
6
 The law is clear that whether one is in an 
7 automobile or on foot, the police have the right to stop 
8 someone in a Level One manner> for a short, 
9 J identification-type search; merely to ask the person who 
they are. This is permissible, as long as it is a purely 
11 consensual, short-term encounter and that there is no 
12 seizure, that is to say, arrest or detention beyond the 
13 person's will. 
14 The distinction appears to depend upon whether 
15 there is any kind of actual arrest or any kind of 
16 physical force or authority exerted or whether the other 
17 person believes his or her freedom of increment is 
18 restrained. But the standard, and this is clear under 
19 State vs. Rameriz. is clearly an objective standard and 
20 it's dependent on whether the defendant remained 
21 cooperatively or because she believed she was not free to 
22 leave. 
2 3 In this case, based upon all the testimony 
24 adduced, this Court finds that there was absolutely no 
25 testimony that she was compelled to remain, but rather, 
1
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v o i c e nr th<p in ! I I 'l"«y bpeak be ing 
II.II i, i c u l a r j / d r ama t i c t he "EMcers i n q u e s t i o n d i d 
m a n i f e s t any of t h i s . 
On "I i Til" \ .it
 r , "I l ie; tx>th appea r t o be q u i t e 
* o t t - s p o k e n , gent lemanly , p r o f e s s i o n a l i ndi v i i n \)s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t i m i d a t i n q b\ " ,' • ' . " t i m i d a t i n g 
bv vir t 'K- •''• "i-Liiiiiibiji )ick\ >t ,*ize, from what t h e <" iu r t 
could observe anil there is iin flung betore me to indi ifp 
otherwise. 
«^ r ^^ —in " facts that 
MLWI: riansen *-*- * identification, that she 
'oluntarily presented The samp 
f 11 " I ,. j "ouc 1 f inds that whi 1 e there we L e 
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three officers in the general vicinity when Ms. Topanotes 
was stopped, to characterize this as three officers 
surrounding her appears to be belied by the facts. 
While it's a very good argument and if it had 
been supported by the facts, it might be more compelling 
to the Court. This Court finds that the testimony, as I 
recall, was that three never did surround her, that there 
were three in the general vicinity but only one directly 
dealing with her and another one sort of close by. And 
the third, quite some distance away. And that there was 
no attempt to surround her or give her the impression her 
liberty had been restricted. 
Further, the Court notes that under state vs. 
vatiinaluna, the appellate case from 1992, and State vg» 
Hansenr the Court feels that this ruling is appropriate. 
Although it is not an automobile-type seizure and of 
course, most of the case law goes to th|tt, the Court 
feels that the basic underlying rationale in all of the 
cases that look at Level One and Level Two stops, needs 
to be considered in this case as well. 
The Court has also considered State v. Jackson, 
the appellate case from 1990, which had wonderful 
language in it that I will repeat, which I believe is 
helpful in making the assessment. 
That case, at Page 768, stated, quote, "A 
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request for n dent-1 n -,-t i imi iniijt c o n s t i t u t e a show :jf 
Wority s u f f i c i e n t to co n v e r t an innocent encounter 
intra a s e i z u r e , i-nly when pn I i -*» h* \ , mi. .,i 
^ s f ra i fiptl > "»• • \'v • i " -.nctividuai , e i t h e r by force 
."w '.il; a u t h o r i t y , i s their" i s e i z u r e within cue 
mir-Miiiing of the Fourth Amendment," 
I I ""lii • I l i n e r s or o f f i c e r a t one point 
1
 i lie* , Jen t i i i c a t i o r , r nore was no t e s t iiirnv *""" suaies1" 
tb i', i f she had asked f^r i •' - < • < • "e ier oi 
•".ail) ' h '1 i>' "i*«i t, t'l'.'pt IN y one wou'd hav-» stopped 
iifii in 1 in ' iiiy r e c o l l e c t i o n is the o f f i c e r s indioafi- l 
.'.1 e a r ly she was not under arrps1 , " " . NLerty had
 M .r 
\"\ i p l i II I " I II I I ' , | II I I I ! Ill
 # 
In making this determination t-hi*? oiijrt" hi< 
considered what courts before M hi ms.
 L leied . In* 
r
 Y\I ' . J1!1 i.i! the enct. m"" where the 
enc o u n t e r occur*i ed in this case, the • !li,r,T; llii11, r IHe 
defendant was already '• ' *. M •  walking 
i" ui*. f-i m.i, i.l'ial the e n c o u n t e r did not e v e n i n v o l v e 
t a k i n g h e r o t t t h e p a t h s h e w.v-1 ii i* " •" i 11 f f ^ i ,-",'" 
lo c a l e *• hfv !*•*" her r IJ] ri • . • m -• M i n n e i
 f win, u is 
i iii III«I s.'i i I ui cl o s e tu ueir home «i comfo r t zone, 
There a p p e a r s to be no isolation invcl'Ti >m Hl 
h e r e a p p e a r s from *:hi» *  ijsr \ 'iv. M \ inaicatiun jf 
jiirii' I IJIIi i encounter . 
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Further, the testimony and I cannot with 
specificity point to the exact time, but I believe an 
officer said five minutes or less was the time of her 
actual stay with the police officers while they did her 
identification check, or the warrants check on the 
identification provided. 
Again, there has been no testimony supportive 
of a weapon exhibited or used by the police, no testimony 
of any touching of her in any way to make her feel 
intimidated or stop her from moving forward in a physical 
manner, no angry voices, inappropriate language or rough 
tone has been attested to; on the contrary, the Court has 
made the observations already noted. 
She is briefly questioned, in no way detained 
against her will. The Court can find nothing to suggest 
a confrontational aspect of this encounter. The mere 
presence of the police officer and their Request— 
officers and their request for identification is not 
sufficient to escalate this to a Level Two Terry stop. 
Over all, there was no evidence that the 
defendant raised any objection, either by her demeanor or 
any kind of non-verbal display or verbally to the 
provision of her identification or the warrants check. 
And for these reasons, the Court denies the 
motion to suppress. 
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1 . c i j . . o ecause T'm 
2 assuming thai tr.iA -a : e - n a m ^ - n n> l 
3 J g o i n g * * ** in il 11 i 11 
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